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ABSTRACT: Corruption and tax evasion problems have been investigated 
separately before. Tax evasion is also considered to be a corrupt behavior itself. 
However, in this paper, corruption is taken to be a bribe taken by a government 
official and tax evasion is defined as an illegal act to avoid paying taxes by violating 
tax laws. An interesting research question would be to see whether corruption can 
induce tax evasion in individuals ? It is found in the paper that the size of bribe can 
negatively affect tax evasion. It is shown that when a bribe is sufficiently large, 
taxpayers prefer to pay their taxes voluntarily, not to evade taxes. 
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ÖZET: Yolsuzluk ve vergi kaçakçılığı sorunları literatürde daha önce ayrı ayrı 
incelendi. Vergi kaçakçılığı da bir yolsuzluk olsa da, bu makalede yolsuzluk devlet 
memurunun rüşvet alması ve vergi kaçakçılığı da mükellefin yasalara aykırı 
davranarak ödemesi gereken vergiyi ödememesi olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bu makalede 
yolsuzluğun vergi kaçakçılığını özendirip özendirmeyeceği teorik olarak 
araştırılmaktadır. Teorik model, istenen rüşvetin yüksek olması durumunda vergi 
mükellefinin vergi kaçırmayacağını matematiksel olarak göstermektedir.  
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yolsuzluk, Vergi Kaçakçılığı . 
 
1. Introduction 
Corruption is an old problem. As long as human beings are on the face of the earth, 
it will be a persistent problem too. I will define corruption here as an illegal activity 
of a government official to gain a personal benefit. Even though it is an old problem, 
it is a relatively fresh investigation area for economists. Tax evasion is also an old 
problem too; people don’t want to pay taxes if they find a way to do so. Tax evasion 
is defined as an illegal act to avoid paying taxes by violating tax laws. So at first 
glance, corruption seems to be a problem of only governments and government 
officials, whereas tax evasion is a problem of private individuals. Their broad 
definitions (corruption in the private sector and among individuals) which I will not 
touch, however, prove otherwise. In the economic literature, both problems have 
been addressed separately in depth. Their combined studies, however, remain to 
deserve further empirical and theoretical analysis. 
 
Corruption, in the existing literature, is modeled in many different ways. Some 
studies claim that corruption might improve efficiency and help growth. Economists 
have shown that, in the second best world when there are pre-existing policy induced 
distortions, additional distortions in the form of smuggling, black marketing, etc. 
may actually improve welfare even when some resources have to be spent in such 
activities (Bardhan, 1997). Bardhan (1997) quotes Nathaniel H. Leff (1964) as “if 
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the government has erred in its decision, the course made possible by corruption 
may well be better the one”. 
 
Another efficiency argument in favor of corruption is to look upon it as “speed 
money”, which reduces delay in moving files in administrative offices and in getting 
ahead in slowing queues for public services. These models allow the possibility for 
the corrupt bureaucrat to practice discrimination among clients with different time 
preference (Bardhan, 1997). 
 
In most of the literature, however, corruption is seen to create inefficiencies. Mauro 
(1995) showed that corruption is found to lower investment, thereby lowering 
economic growth. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that corruption would tend to 
lower economic growth, and Rose-Ackerman (1978) warns of the difficulty of 
limiting corruption to areas in which it might be economically desirable. Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1991) argue that countries where talented people are allocated 
to rent seeking activities tend to grow more slowly. In the present paper, the growth 
effects of corruption and tax evasion will not be discussed per se. Efficiency and 
distributive effects, however, will be very apparent. As will be explained in the 
following pages, the understanding of corruption, in this paper, is different from that 
of existing literature: the government official is not selling a publicly provided 
private good with a bribe added to official price, instead he is stealing the tax money 
of private individual with the knowledge of that private individual. 
 
Most models of corruption used the principal-agent framework as a tool to study it 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1975, 1978, Klitgaard 1988, 1991). Most others, however, 
assumed that the principal-agent framework is given (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, 
Benarjee, 1997) and extended the model to emphasize a specific point that is 
considered to be important by particular authors. For example, Sheleifer and Vishny 
(1993) look at the corruption with and without theft of government good, accepting 
a priori that the principal-agent framework is in work. They also look at “the 
industrial organization of corruption” and conclude that corruption is higher if 
government offices provide the public good independently, meaning each of them 
are behaving like a profit maximizing monopolist separately as opposed to 
centralization of government offices. 
 
Tax evasion is (has been) being studied intensively in the literature. Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972), and Kolm (1973) are excellent survey studies about tax evasion. 
Alligham and Sandmo (1972) claim that the tax declaration decision is a decision 
under uncertainty and assume that the tax-payer’s behavior conforms to the Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms for behavior under uncertainty. And they maximize 
the expected utility of the representative tax-payer, taking into account optimal tax 
evasion under uncertainty and risk. Their comparative results state that an increase 
in the penalty rate will always increase the fraction of actual income declared and 
that an increase in the probability of detection will always lead to a larger income 
being declared. Srinivasan (1973) uses the same type of model to study tax evasion. 
Unlike the Allingham and Sandmo model, this model uses expected income as an 
objective function to maximize, taking into account tax evasion and risk of it 
(penalty). The results of both models, however, are remarkably similar: the optimal 
proportion by which income is understated decreases as the probability of detection 
increases. 
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As can be seen from the summary above, corruption and tax evasion models look at 
the problem from their own perspectives. Corruption models don’t take account the 
fact that individuals can be induced to evade taxes when, say, bribery exists among 
tax collectors, a government official, and conduct the analysis in the absence of 
government corruption. Tax evasion itself can be considered a corrupt activity and 
corruption can include tax evasion conceptually. In this paper, however, corruption 
is taken to be a bribe taken by a government official. An interesting research 
question would be to see whether corruption can induce tax evasion in individuals, 
and whether the government’s effort to prevent both evasion and corruption can be 
viable. The problem can be investigated from several different perspectives. On the 
same line of research would be to look at the determinants of wage structure among 
the government officials and try to find the determinants of bribery. My intuition for 
that if the detection probability is sufficiently low and bribery is an expected activity 
in the society (low expectation for getting punished for bribery), some government 
official will find it optimal to take bribes even if they get paid efficient wages, well 
above their reservations wages. One interesting study on this line is McLaren 
(1996). In that paper, McLaren looks at the fiscal corruption among government 
officials and observes that the firm chooses its level of compliance with the 
regulation (this can be taken compliance with the tax code); simultaneously the 
inspector chooses his level of effort. If the latter catches the formers violation, the 
inspector can report it, causing the firm to be fined, and receives a fraction of the 
fine as a commission; if it is more profitable to collude with the firm, the inspector 
reports no violation, and splits the saving with the firm. If collusion occurs, there is 
some probability that it will be discovered and an extra fine charged to the firm and 
the inspector fired. It is clear in this setting that a rise in civil service compensation 
can have a perverse effect on civil service performance, if corruption is occurring in 
equilibrium. A rise in the inspector’s salary is like a rise in his fine for bribery, since 
that is what he will lose if he is caught and fired. Thus, a rise in his salary makes it 
less profitable, in expectation, to take a bribe; but in an equilibrium with corruption, 
unless the salary goes up far enough to make the inspector give up on bribery 
altogether, the bribe is his return to effort; thus, his inspection effort rationally drops. 
Paying a corrupt civil servant high wages actually induces “sloth”. It may either 
raise or lower firm compliance; if the inspector does catch a violation, he will 
require a bribe higher, to compensate him for the higher risk. But because he is not 
trying very hard, it is less likely that he will catch a violation. The net effects on the 
firm’s incentives are ambiguous. 
 
In another paper by Besley and McLaren (1993), the problem of inspector effort is 
assumed away, but the government faces an additional complication: although tax 
inspectors may have an incentive to collude with taxpayers to conceal taxable 
income, not all potential tax inspectors have the inclination. Some may well be 
predisposed to honesty and not willing to accept a bribe at any price. Ideally the 
government would like to employ only those, but ex ante it can not distinguish 
between them and corruptible ones. Thus the government faces not only the moral 
hazard problem, but also an adverse selection problem, which can be parameterized 
by the fraction of potential inspectors who are corruptible in the pool from which the 
government hires. Besley and McLaren (1993) start modeling by calling that 
fraction γ. And they consider three optimal wage structures depending on the 
particular circumstances. First, there is minimum value for the inspectors’ wage, 
called the efficiency wage, at which it will not be worthwhile for a corruptible 
inspector to accept a bribe. This must be strictly above the wage the inspector could 
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receive in her next-best alternative occupation, reservation wage; further the 
efficiency premium wage premium must be an increasing function of q, the 
probability with which bribery will go undetected. If the inspectors are paid the 
efficiency wage, they all refuse bribes, and all tax owed are collected; if they are 
paid the reservation wage, the corruptible ones always take bribes, but a fraction (1-
q) of the time they are caught and replaced, with the evaded taxes recovered by the 
government. In their model, clearly the optimal wage would never be above the 
efficiency wage, or between that and the reservation wage. Finally, it is conceivable 
that the optimal wage could be below the reservation wage, since at least the 
corruptible potential inspectors are willing to work for less than their opportunity 
wage, knowing that they will be able to make additional income from bribery. The 
authors call the wage at which corruptible inspectors will just make their opportunity 
income when bribery is taken into account, the capitulation wage. If the government 
pays this, it is giving in to the problem of bribery altogether since it will be 
accepting an entirely dishonest workforce that will be accepting bribes all of the 
time. In this case, it will collect revenues only when it catches bribery in action, or 
(1-q) of the time. In the Besley and McLaren (1993) model, it turns out that each of 
these wage levels can be optimal under different circumstances. If γ is small, the 
reservation wage is optimal, since it would not be worth paying a premium to all 
inspectors just to motivate honest behavior in a tiny minority of them, and it is not 
worth economizing on the wage by passing less than the reservation wage if that will 
convert an almost entirely honest inspector force into an entirely dishonest one. If γ 
is large and q is small, it is worth paying the largely corruptible the small premium 
required. Thus, efficiency wages are optimal. If γ and q, however, are both large, 
efficiency wages are too expensive to be attractive, and paying reservation wages 
would simply allow most of the inspector force to enjoy bribery rents most of the 
time at the government’s expense. The government might as well lower their wages 
to reclaim those rents; thus, capitulation wages become optimal.  
 
As for the relationship between corruption and tax evasion, which is the main 
interest of this paper, Tanzi and Davoodi (2001) state that economies characterized 
by a great extent of corruption are argues to be plagued by substantial tax evasion 
activities as well. Since empirical literature is so scarce about tax evasion and 
corruption, few theoretical papers find that corruption among tax enforcement agents 
increases income tax evasion since the effective penalty declines, providing a 
theoretical argument for a positive link between tax evasion and corruption. Bowles 
(1999) Sanyal et al. (2000) and Sanyal (2002) show that tax revenues may decline 
with the income tax rate in the presence of corrupt tax officials and investigate the 
impact of alternative reward schemes on the behavior of corrupt tax officials and the 
level of corruption.  
 
In terms of interactive models of tax evasion and bureaucratic corruption, recent 
studies of Goerke (2006) and Acconcia et al. (2003) deserve a brief review. Goerke 
(2006) states that firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal 
restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown in his paper 
that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm 
level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. 
Policy measures that alter the gains or losses from corruption have a non-systematic 
impact on tax evasion behavior.  
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Acconcia et al. (2003) consider a simple economy where self-interested taxpayers 
may have incentives to evade taxes and to escape sanctions, by bribing public 
officials in charge for tax collection. It is found in the paper that larger fines for 
evasion will increase tax compliance with ambiguous effects on corruption while 
larger fines for corruption reduce corruption at the cost of reducing tax compliance.  
 
2. The Model 
All the models we looked at so far are not particularly helpful for our purpose we are 
about to lay out. One interesting research problem would be to look at the interaction 
between bribery and tax evasion. Bribery and tax evasion can, of course, exist 
independently: if there is no bribery, it does not necessarily mean that there is no tax 
evasion. However, it would be interesting to see how bribery affects tax evasion and 
how tax-payers would be inclined to pay bribes to maximize their expected income. 
Therefore, our model will combine the tax evasion problem with corruption, namely 
bribery. There are three different groups of people in the model, individual tax-
payers, tax collectors, and inspectors. Tax collectors can be considered to be low 
level inspectors too, who have the chance to investigate the tax returns of the 
individuals and they are the first people who come the contact with the tax-payers. 
Inspectors can be considered to be high level government officials and they both 
audit the individuals and inspect tax collectors. As can be seen from the set up that 
inspectors are principals and tax collectors (low level inspectors) are the agents. 
Therefore the principal-agent problem is given in the model. The society in which 
our model is operating is expecting some level of corruption, meaning there is an 
expectation that government officials are to some degree corrupt. Each group of 
people are trying to maximize their income: individuals are trying to maximize their 
expected income after taking into account bribe and penalty in the case that they are 
caught, tax collectors are trying to maximize their bribe and the principal is trying to 
maximize government revenue. In this model, we will put the principal problem 
aside, hoping to include this problem explicitly into the model in another paper. 
Therefore we will focus on the interaction between tax collectors and individuals. 
This interaction could have been modeled in a game theoretic framework by 
exploiting the mechanics of “coordination” problem and we would have come up 
with multiple equilibria, some of them stable and some unstable. However, this 
would create an analytical difficulty and complexity if we would want to include the 
“principle’s” problem into the model. The interaction between these groups would 
have been modeled in a dynamic setting as well, taking the time horizon of the tax 
collectors, which can be a topic for a totally different paper. 
 
2.1 The Individuals’ Problem 
Individuals are trying to maximize their expected income, taking into account that 
tax collectors ask for bribes according to individuals’ taxes. Therefore, bribe (B) is a 
function of tax (T), and therefore income (Y), and probability, p(n), with which a tax 
evasion or bribery will get caught, B=B (T,p(n)). Bribe is taken away from the tax to 
be paid and for the tax payer it is lump sum. Probability depends on the resources 
allocated to inspection, namely, the number of high level inspectors, n, in our case 
here, but it can be extended to the effort level etc. too. Penalty function (penalty 
multiplier) is a function of bribe and the ratio, γ, by which the taxable income is 
reduced. Now we have ( )( )npTBB ,= , since YT θ= , then ( )( )npYBB ,θ=  where θ is 
the proportional income tax rate and Y is income, which is exogenous. We can 
assume that the partial derivative of bribe function with respect to probability is 
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positive although it can be negative too. And we will also assume that bribe is an 
increasing function of tax, therefore income, although it can be a decreasing function 
of tax and income too. 
 
P=Penalty function (penalty multiplier) and ( )γ,BPP = , again we assume that both 
argument of this penalty function have positive partial derivatives. Now the 
representative individual will maximize his expected income, E[I], taking into 
account both uncertainty and risk. Now we have 
 
Max  
[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
( )( ) ( ){ }[ ]YBYnp
YBPBYTYnpIE
θγ
γγ
−−−−+
−−−=
11
,
 
(1) 
 
with respect to γ . We are assuming that this maximized expected income is greater 
then Y-T(Y), otherwise the taxpayer will not give bribe and will not evade (now in 
this case we are assuming again that if the tax collector ask for a bribe and if the 
taxpayer does not give it, then the taxpayer will not evade since the collector will 
pay a special attention to catch it. The first order condition is: 
 
 [ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )
γ
γγγγ
γ ∂
∂
−+∂∂+=
∂
∂ TYpYBPBPpIE 1/,,
   
 ( )BpY ,,,γφ≡   (lets say) (3) 
 
It is assumed that for an interior solution second order conditions satisfy 0/ <∂∂ γφ . 
Also, it is also assumed that ( ) 0,,,0 >BpYφ , therefore ( )0,BP  must be sufficiently 
small. Now to get the comparative static results, it can be evaluated that  
 
 ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]22222 /1//2/ γγγγγφ ∂∂−−∂+∂∂−=∂∂ ∂ TYpYPPp   (4) 
 
 ( )[ ] )/()/(,/ γγγγφ ∂∂−∂∂+−=∂∂ TYYPBPp  (5) 
 
 [ ][ ]BPBPpB ∂∂∂∂+∂∂−=∂∂ //)/(/ γφ  (6) 
 
Now lets assume that the tax on income is a positive, increasing, and convex (non 
linear) function of income. Lets also assume that penalty multiplier is a positive, 
increasing, and convex function ofγ . It is also assumed that penalty multiplier is 
positive, increasing and a convex function of bribe, B. Under these conditions it is 
clear that γφ ∂∂ / <0, p∂∂ /φ <0, B∂∂ /φ <0 
 
Result. After maximizing the expected income of the taxpayers with respect to γ , if 
the maximized expected income, E[I], is greater than Y-T(Y), then the taxpayer will 
give bribes and evade taxes. If this happens, the following comparative result holds 
 
0/ <
∂∂
∂∂
−=∂∂
γφ
φγ BB
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when bribery increases, tax evasion will decrease.  
 
If however, maximum expected income, E[I]< Y-T(Y), then the taxpayer will refuse 
to pay bribe and will not evade taxes, knowing that if he evades, he will get caught 
by ‘angry’ tax collector.  
 
Now we can look at the tax collector’s problem. 
 
2.2 The Tax Collector’s Problem 
The tax collector will try to maximize his bribe, taking into account to get caught 
and pay penalty. Then his expected income, expected bribe is  
 Max [ ] ( ) ( )γ,BPnpBBE −=  (7) 
Even though one would think that there would be a different penalty function for the 
tax collector, since bribe and tax evasion are happening at the same time, it is 
assumed that it is the same penalty function for the tax collector as taxpayer.  
  
Unless we have an explicit form of the penalty function, we can not solve for 
maximum amount of bribe. But it is clear from this function that if the inspector 
wants this tax collector to stop taking bribes, then he has two policy options to 
arrange. He will either increase the probability of detection or increase the penalty or 
both. If he increases the penalty too much without increasing the penalty rate, it can 
induce the tax collector to keep taking bribes since probability is low. Therefore, 
there should be an optimal combination of the two which can not be known a priori 
without further empirical work. In this separate income maximization problem, the 
taxpayer and tax collector can not be settled down with a mutual beneficial bribe, tax 
evasion combination. It is likely that there will be a conflict between the two, 
namely the tax collector and the taxpayer. For example, bribe maximizing bribe 
level for the tax collector is not likely to be an optimal point for the taxpayer. They 
will be going back and forth between optimal bribe and tax evasion points. What is 
interesting is that if they collude and behave like a single agent against the inspector, 
then they will solve the bribe and tax evasion problem simultaneously. Now we can 
model that behavior. 
 
3. Collusion 
The taxpayer’s income is: 
=IP  the taxpayer’s income (expected) 
[ ] ( )( )YTYIEIP +−=  where [ ]IE  is equation (1) above  
The tax collector’s income is 
=IC  The collector’s income (expected) ( ) ( )γ,BPnpBIC −=  
The combined income, TI (expected) 
ICIPTI +=  
After some algebraic manipulations, we get  
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )γ,2121 BpPpYTpYYTTI −−−−=   (8) 
 
Now after maximizing this equation (8) with respect to B and γ , we can have two 
first order conditions. 
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 ( )( ) [ ] 0/21/ =∂∂−−=∂∂ γγ PppYTTI  
 ( )( ) ppYTP 2/1/ −=∂∂= γ  (8.1) 
 
 0// =∂∂=∂∂ BPBTI  (8.2) 
 
Now we have two equations and two unknowns and we can solve for both B and γ  
if we know the explicit forms of the functions. As can be seen from these two 
equations, B and γ will depend on probability of detection. And that probability can 
depend on many things in real life applications (we assumed here that it depends on 
the number of inspectors). 
 
4. Concluding Remarks and Further Research 
In some countries, this collusion can really happen on purpose because the tax 
collector can “collect” small bribes from small businesses and the tax inspector can 
deliberately reduce the probability by keeping their number sufficiently low. They 
do it so because after working in a high level public inspection institution for a 
number of years, they transfer to the “big” businesses with more profitable positions. 
By keeping their number sufficiently low, they control the supply of their knowledge 
deliberately and gain a reputation in the sense they are not corruptible. After 
changing their position from the public office to private companies, they go with 
their “insider information” and cause the higher level tax evasion or lobbying which 
might increase the inefficiencies.  
 
4.1 Further Research 
Inspector’s revenue maximization problem can be included into the model explicitly. 
And in terms of separate income maximization, we, in this model, assumed that 
causality is coming from the tax collector in terms of bribe generation. The 
taxpayers, however, can see bribes as the tools of tax evasion. And this can be 
modeled by including γ into the bribe function. This can make things more 
complicated. There will be a simultaneous determination of bribe and γ even when 
we try to maximize expected incomes separately. 
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